Contemporary issues in banking by Molyneux, Phil & Wilson, John O. S.
Accepted Manuscript
Contemporary issues in banking
Phil Molyneux, John O.S. Wilson
PII: S0890-8389(16)30042-7
DOI: 10.1016/j.bar.2016.10.004
Reference: YBARE 735
To appear in: The British Accounting Review
Please cite this article as: Molyneux, P., Wilson, J.O.S., Contemporary issues in banking, The British
Accounting Review (2016), doi: 10.1016/j.bar.2016.10.004.
This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication. As a service to
our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript. The manuscript will undergo
copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting proof before it is published in its final form. Please
note that during the production process errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all
legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain.
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
 
 
1 
 
Editorial 
Contemporary Issues in Banking 
Phil Molyneux
+
 & John O.S. Wilson
x*
 
+
Phil Molyneux, Bangor Business School, Bangor University, Bangor, Gwynedd, UK, LL57 2DG 
Email: p.molyneux@bangor.ac.uk.  
x
John O.S. Wilson, School of Management, University of St Andrews, St Andrews, Fife, UK 
KY16 9RJ Email: jsw7@st-andrews.ac.uk. 
 
 Over the past decade or so, banks have been affected by an array of shocks, which 
have transformed the industry. The global financial crisis of 2007-2008 coupled with the 
euro sovereign debt crisis of 2010-2012 and the subsequent recessions in many countries all 
combined to create a new macroeconomic environment with slower economic growth, low 
(or negative) interest rates and a new policy environment (where credit and quantitative 
easing and other alternative monetary policies are prevalent). All these forces have affected 
the performance and strategies of banks. Extensive regulatory and supervisory reforms have 
also taken place in order to reduce the risks in the banking and wider financial services 
sector (Berger, Molyneux and Wilson, 2015). In the United States, the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 has introduced controls designed to 
reduce the likelihood of future taxpayer bailouts of major banks by limiting proprietary 
trading and other volatile business areas. Similar major reforms have taken place in the 
European Union, not least the moves to create a European Banking Union and the 
introduction of a Single Resolution Mechanism that became partially operational after the 
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introduction of the EU-wide Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive in 2015 (Schoenmaker, 
2016).  
 Regulations relating to bank solvency and liquidity have been substantially 
strengthened (under Basel III that comes fully into force in 2019). Also, systemically 
important banks and other systemic institutions (including large insurance companies, 
exchanges, market infrastructure providers) are also subject to increased capital 
requirements and tougher regulatory oversight (Herring and Carmassi, 2015).  These 
regulations and other structural reforms have compelled banks to reduce riskiness of their 
asset portfolios in order to meet more demanding capital and liquidity requirements, and 
pass ongoing stress tests undertaken by various regulatory agencies (such as the US Federal 
Reserve, and the European Banking Authority (EBA)). For example, many large European 
banks have moved away from the higher risk (higher regulatory capital) areas of investment 
banking and securities trading toward lower risk areas such as retail banking and wealth 
management. Banks have also reduced their exposure to private equity and hedge funds.  
 Measuring and managing risk has become an even more critical feature of the 
business carried out by banks and other financial services firms. During the financial crisis of 
2007-2008 it became evident (as mortgage and bond defaults increased) that market 
participants and regulators had seriously underestimated the extent of credit and extreme 
(tail) risks in the financial system. This has led many to reconsider both the measurement 
and management of credit, market, liquidity and operational risks. Of particular interest has 
been the accounting treatment of credit risk indicators such as loan loss-provisions and 
reserves, the (fair) valuation of financial instruments as well as issues covering transparency 
of off-balance sheet activities. Bank financial reporting under International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRSs) has changed, the most important being modifications to IFRS 9 
on valuing financial instruments and aligning this with new rules introduced under Basel III. 
There has also been a growing interest in using market indicators of credit risk, such as CDS 
spreads and credit ratings as a complement to accounting indicators (such as loan-loss 
provisioning). The credit ratings industry has also come under particular scrutiny, given that 
credit rating agencies provided over-optimistic credit risk assessments of securitised 
mortgaged based instruments prior to the global financial crisis. The ratings industry has 
also been blamed for conflicts of interest (moral hazard) that incentivised agencies to 
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
 
 
3 
 
provide generous bond ratings. This has resulted in new regulations limiting certain 
activities of rating agencies in both the U.S and Europe.  
 The global financial crisis also brought to light both the causes and consequences of 
financial sector liberalization and an environment that incentivised excessive risk-taking. 
Some have blamed inappropriate bank corporate governance that encouraged CEOs and 
senior managers to focus on shareholder value maximization at the expense of safety and 
soundness. Executive remuneration tied to stock and option valuations prioritised risk-
taking as it boosted returns over the short-term and neglected longer-term wealth creation 
objectives. There has been much discussion about perverse incentives and appropriate 
governance structures in banking and this debate remains ongoing (Bank of International 
Settlements, 2015). Perceived bad behaviour in the boardroom is not the only area where 
inappropriate actions have occurred. We have witnessed the LIBOR scandal regarding the 
rigging of interbank money market rates as well as allegations of price fixing in other 
financial benchmark settings (foreign exchange rates, gold prices, oil prices among others). 
Also there are ongoing legal cases in the US and Europe relating to the mis-selling of 
mortgage backed securities (in the run-up to the 2007-8 crisis). In the UK the mis-selling of 
payment protection insurance and pensions has been another scandal.  These examples 
provide apt illustrations of bad behaviour of banks when dealing with clients, and have led 
to calls for the industry to adhere to higher ethical and professional standards. Recognition 
of these problems has also helped push consumer protection issues into the forefront of 
regulatory and supervisory policy.    
 In the light of these major developments, this special issue of the British Accounting 
Review aims to provide a timely and comprehensive overview of advances in banking 
research. The contributions contained in the special issue engage and inform current and 
emerging debate on the actual and likely effects of the aforementioned structural and 
regulatory reforms on the banking and financial services industry. This special issue is 
associated with the Contemporary Issues in Banking conference which was held at the 
Centre for Responsible Banking and Finance at the School of Management, University of St 
Andrews on December 8
th
 and 9
th
 2015.  This special issue is structured as follows. 
 The paper on Bank Transparency and the Crisis by Panayotis Manganaris, Elena 
Beccalli and Panagiotis Dimitropoulos investigates accounting practice and the treatment of 
bank loan-losses. Using a large sample of European banks the authors evaluate the first few 
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years (2005-2007) of IFRS adoption and find little evidence of conservative provisioning 
behaviour. However, (and as expected) banks become more conservative with the onset of 
the crisis in 2007. The observed behaviour of banks accords with the extant literature, which 
suggests accounting practice becomes more conservative during contractionary periods. Put 
simply, loan-loss provisioning became more timely and transparent, presumably because 
banks wished to mitigate the adverse consequences of reporting (excessively) opaque 
financial statements in the aftermath of the crisis. During this period banks also focused on 
cleaning up balance sheets by removing bad credit risks. The regulatory desire to make 
more transparent bank credit risk is also reflected in recent moves by the European Banking 
Authority to harmonise reporting on loan-loss provisions. 
 Regulatory measures designed to improve bank soundness and reduce the likelihood 
of future taxpayer financed bank bailouts have focused substantially on boosting the capital 
strength and liquidity of banks. Laura Chiaramonte and Barbara Casu investigate Capital and 
Liquidity Ratios and Financial Distress in their study of European banks. In particular, they 
investigate whether the liquidity and capital features of banks reduce the probability of 
failure. Increased liquidity reduces the probability of bank distress. An interesting finding is 
that it seems that capital standards only appear to reduce fragility for the EUs largest banks. 
The author’s findings appear consistent with the recent regulatory focus on reducing the 
fragility of globally systemically important banks (G-SIBs) under Basel III.  
 Loan-loss provisioning behaviour of banks is inextricably linked to the specific 
accounting setting. In the paper The predictive ability of loan loss provisions in banks – 
Effects of accounting standards, enforcement and incentives, Jan Marton and Emmeli 
Runesson examine how different accounting treatment of loan-loss provisioning may help 
predict future credit losses. Using a sample of EU and Swiss banks covering the period 2000 
to 2011, the authors find that the current IFRS approach to provisioning (incurred loss 
model) provides more objective guidance on credit losses than alternative accounting 
treatments under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles GAAP, but yields poorer 
forecasts of future credit losses. This is explained by the fact that the incurred loss model 
reduces the timeliness of provisioning and this can also have pro-cyclical effects potentially 
reinforcing the detrimental effects of accounting treatment of credit losses at times of crisis. 
Earlier recognition of credit losses are revealed using local GAAP rules subject to there being 
strong enforcement in terms of reporting expected losses. The authors note that their 
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findings are consistent with the IASB’s and FASB’s introduction of expected loss models for 
recognition of future bad credits.      
 Domenico Curcio, Antonio De Simone and Angela Gallo investigate the Financial 
Crisis and International Supervision: New Evidence on the Discretionary use of Loan Loss 
Provisions at Euro Area Commercial Banks. The authors examine bank provisioning 
behaviour over the period 2005 to 2011. The authors find that Euro Area banks provision to 
smooth income, but not capital. This effect is more pronounced after the financial crisis. In 
terms of the EBA stress tests, the authors find no difference in capital smoothing for banks 
subject to stress testing and their non-tested counterparts. There is some evidence that for 
the 2011 stress tests the biggest banks under-provisioned to smooth earnings. The authors 
argue in order to aid bank financial statement transparency there should be (more) timely 
reporting of the EBA stress tests.     
 Since the global financial crisis the credit rating industry has been subject to 
significant regulatory reform, particularly in Europe, with the introduction of Credit Rating 
Agency (CRA) I Regulation in 2009 that put in place an EU system for certifying and 
regulating rating agencies (effective from July 2011 onwards). Part as a response to this new 
environment Standard & Poor’s (S & P) converted the solicitation status on several 
sovereigns to unsolicited (these are simply ratings where the debt issuer has not paid or 
worked with the rating issue to come up with the rating). In their study on Does the 
Disclosure of Unsolicited Sovereign Rating Status Affect Bank Ratings? Patrycja Klusak, Rasha 
Alsakka and Owain ap Gwilym investigate whether changes in sovereign rating status 
influence bank ratings. It is long known that the sovereigns have the highest quality ratings 
and big bank ratings just hover below, usually moving in tandem with the sovereign. The 
authors utilise a sample of 147 listed banks from 42 countries between 2006 and 2013. They 
find that banks from countries whose ratings convert to unsolicited status have a higher 
probability of a rating downgrade and lower probabilities of rating upgrades compared to 
other banks. The authors argue that the most likely explanation for this effect is strategic 
conservatism, where  S&P have less information on borrowers when ratings are unsolicited 
so they tend to rate them more conservatively (less favourably). This feeds through into 
lower bank credit ratings.  
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 The governance of banks has been of substantial public and policy interest especially 
post-crisis (Wilson et al, 2010; Hagendorff, 2015). In their paper on Governance, Efficiency 
and Risk Taking in Chinese Banking, Yizhe Dong, Claudia Girardone and Jing-Ming Kuo 
investigate whether various board features (size, composition and functioning) influence 
risk-taking and efficiency. Using a sample of Chinese banks over the period 2003 to 2011, 
the authors find that board characteristics have a more marked impact on bank profit and 
cost efficiency than on credit quality. Having a larger proportion of female directors on the 
board boosts efficiency and lowers credit risk. A higher level of board independence is 
linked to greater profit efficiency whereas the opposite is found in the case of dual 
leadership (where the CEO is also the chair of the board). The authors also find that 
ownership concentration influences governance and efficiency relationships, and bank 
liquidity is also found to be a key driver of both cost and profit efficiency. Overall, the results 
suggest a case for greater gender diversity on bank boards.  
 Following the financial crisis there has been discussion as to whether large and / or 
complex financial institutions should be regulated differently from their smaller 
counterparts.  In the paper Irish Credit Unions: Differential Regulation based on Business 
Model Complexity, Barry Quinn and Donal McKillop use the credit union industry in Ireland 
over 2002-2013 as a laboratory to investigate whether credit unions adopt different 
business models, and what the effects are on performance. The authors utilise a latent class 
approach, which uses financial and other characteristics of individual credit unions to 
identify different business models. The authors identify three distinct types of credit union 
based on efficiency and other financial indicators. They find that credit unions suffer from 
diseconomies of scale in two of the three classes identified. Having three distinct types of 
business model suggests that a uniform regulatory approach for dealing effectively with the 
sector may not be appropriate, and a case can be made for reducing the scale of two types 
of credit union so they can realise greater scale economies.  
 As noted earlier, consumer protection issues in the financial services sector has 
become an important topic, especially after a range of mis-selling scandals in the UK and 
elsewhere (Campbell et al, 2011). In The Price, Quality and Distribution of Mortgage 
Payment Protection Insurance: A Hedonic Pricing Approach, John Ashton and Robert Hudson 
investigate the pricing of a form of insurance that is sold to pay off mortgage credit in the 
event of job loss, accident or illness. Concerns regarding Mortgage Payment Protection 
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Insurance (MPPI) led the UK’s Competition Commission to rule that after February 2011 the 
product should not be sold jointly with mortgage loans within seven days of the credit 
transaction. The authors focus on this prohibition via an investigation of MPPI premiums 
when the product is sold independently or sold jointly with a mortgage. They find that 
policies sold jointly are more expensive for a given set of benefits and conditions than those 
sold independently, suggesting that premiums were uncompetitive in the former case. This 
disparity disappears after the introduction of the new rules.   
 In addition to major banks, other large financial firms are subject to stress tests and 
increased regulatory oversight, not least large insurance firms, some of which are deemed 
globally systemic financial institutions.  In the paper Curbing Systemic Risk in the Insurance 
Sector: A Mission Impossible?, Paola Bongini, Laura Nieri, Matteo Pelagatti and Andrea 
Piccini use an event study approach to evaluate whether the introduction of new Global 
Systemically Important Insurance (G-SII) regulations led to a reduction in the market value 
of affected insurers. Using a sample of the world’s largest insurance firms the authors 
investigate whether the publication of the first list of nine G-SIIs had any market reaction.  
Overall the authors find that the market values of G-SIIs were unaffected by the 
introduction of the new regulations. This implies that investors believe that tougher capital 
and other forms of enhanced regulatory oversight were not expected to influence future 
performance. This is similar to the results from banking studies that find little stock price 
reaction to being announced too-big-to-fail (Abreu and Gulamhussen, 2013).     
 Overall, this special issue of selected papers from the Contemporary Issues in 
Banking Conference provides the reader with new insights into recent research issues 
related to the study of banks and other financial institutions. Most noticeably recent 
research focuses on risk measurement and the accounting setting, corporate governance, 
consumer protection and regulating systemically important banks and other financial 
institutions. There is also a continued interest in how these factors feed through into bank 
performance, competition and innovation in the financial sector. We hope you find the 
special edition of interest and a guide for future research.    
 
JW and PM 
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